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John Kay: The Truth About Markets:
why some nations are rich, but most remain poor
(Penguin: 2004)
“Self-regarding
materialism is the principal determinant of economic behaviour, and
government should not restrict it. Financial markets are the main
regulators of economic activity. The economic role of the state is the
protection of property rights and the enforcement of contracts; I call
this the American business model [ABM]...as the greatest admiration for
[the] model is to be found in the American business community.
Arbitrariness and disparities in the distribution of income are
justified - even morally justified - simply because they are market
outcomes.... Greed in politics is disastrous, because politicians can
use the coercive power of the state to get other people’s money. Greed
in business is virtuous, because producing the goods and services
people want is the only way to extract money from them. [Therefore,]
the political sphere should be as small as possible, and the business
sphere as large as possible.... [And,] with greed the mainspring of the
market economy, redistributive taxation inhibits its progress.... The
model meets a deep-seated need for simple, universal explanations of
complex phenomena. Its appeal directly parallels that of the Marxist
doctrines it has supplanted, [as] its prescriptions are not just right,
but inevitable, [and] its proponents show the same ingenuity in
attributing all social and economic problems to government that
Marxists displayed in attributing all social and economic problems to
capital.... [However, despite such myths,] the real issues of economics
are vital and fascinating, and raise some of the most important social
and political questions of our time. Why are some people and countries
rich, and others poor? Why did centrally planned regimes fail in
economic competition with market economies? How do decentralized market
economies co-ordinate complex products, and global distribution? How do
economic systems handle risks? How do they deal with inequalities of
information? How do they distribute the rewards between different
members of the teams which manage complex production processes? How do
markets co-ordinate networks? How do they stimulate knowledge and
innovation? What really determines our economic behaviour - how we
work, and what we consume? What should be the role of government in a
modern economy? These are the questions with which this book is
concerned. [And,] in answering them, I shall show that the American
business model is not, and could not be, a correct description of how
the American economy works, [for] the countries that most closely
resemble its prescriptions of unrestrained individualism with minimal
government are among the poorest on the planet. Effective market
economies are embedded in an elaborate social, political, and cultural
context, and could not function outside that context.”
(Kay, pp.4-10)
As I write these words in 2008, the American business model is indeed
demonstrating its manifest inadequacy, in the face of massive systemic
failure on the commanding heights of Wall St...making this a
particularly timely review. For, with the self-evident breakdown of the
mythology, what is now needed - more than ever - is a comprehensive
& accessible overview of the real import of the full range of economic studies, rather than just the
narrow & misguided mainstream. And this, John Kay offers,
whilst - in passing - delivering well-aimed asides skewering the key
weaknesses of neo-liberal orthodoxy:
“A good model is like a biblical parable and, like parables, is neither true nor false: only illuminating or unilluminating.”
(Kay, p.11)
“The ABM is deficient
for its naive approach to issues of human motivation, its simplistic
analysis of structures of property rights, its inability to maintain
efficiency in the face of imperfect information, its misleading account
of markets in risk, its glossing over of problems of co-operation and
co-ordination, and its failure to describe the generation of the new
knowledge on which its very success depends.”
(Kay, p.319)
For an in-depth analysis of said deficiencies, I would recommend Paul Ormerod’s Death of Economics (1994)...however, for readers aiming at an overview of exactly where
scientific (as opposed to ideological) economics stands of late, John
Kay’s work can hardly be bettered. An economist himself - and columnist
with the conservative Financial Times - Kay begins with the most basic questions a reader would have,
establishes historical context throughout, and is unafraid of
theoretical pluralism - a genuinely rare virtue in an economist. The
outcome, as a result, shows us what we can properly learn from
economics today - as well as clearly marking its many failings...
“What features of the
environment into which people are born, or migrate, make...a difference
to their economic lives? For most of economic history, it was believed
that the explanation was to be found in the availability of physical
resources....[but] it is a modern cliché that Silicon Valley is
not built on reserves of silicon.... [And] productivity is not simply
the result of the availability of capital and technology, of
differences in the skills of individual workers. In the modern world,
skills can be developed everywhere, and capital and technology flow
freely between countries. Economic differences persist because output
and living standards are the complex product of the intersection of the
economic environment with associated social, political and cultural
institutions, [and] the economic lives of individuals are the product
of the systems within which they operate.... This is what I describe as
the embedded market.... That embeddedness is the continuing theme of
this book. Different cultures have made different choices about the
ways in which the capacities of their economies are reflected in the
economic lives of their citizens. These choices are partly the result
of individual decisions - how long to spend over lunch - and collective
decisions - what resources to devote to public schools or transport
systems. [And] there are no economic criteria that enable us to
conclude that some choices are right and others wrong. Nor is there an
inevitable convergence. Diversity is an important feature of economic
life.... But differences in economic performance and experience among
rich states are small and temporary, differences between rich and poor
states large and enduring, [and] any theory of the relative success and
failure of economic systems must explain this central fact.”
(Kay, pp.14-36)
“A modern economic
system is a complex, interacting set of institutions, which has evolved
over thousands of years.... [However, as late as] the second half of
the eighteenth century, there was little difference between living
standards in Western Europe and those in the rest of the world....
[But] in the first half of the nineteenth century, a small group began
to pull away, and in each subsequent period a few other states caught
up, mostly those which were more productive to begin with. And the
newly productive countries have almost always been on the geographical
borders of those that are already productive.... [In] Western Europe,
the group expanded steadily from a central core, gradually encompassing
peripheral areas, [but] in Asia, geographic contiguity seems to be
equally significant, but precisely in the opposite direction. Richer
states are peripheral and, even within China itself, coastal regions
have higher incomes. It is as though an economic blight has centred on
Beijing - and perhaps this is the right way to see it.... The history
of the world, said Carlyle, is but the biography of great men. Perhaps,
but the history of the market economy is not.... The evolution of
market institutions took place within the context of a range of other
evolutions - in technology, in culture, in politics and the
organization of society - and could not have occurred in their absence.
But pluralism was common to all these processes. Modern scientific
method generated and tested new hypotheses: the principles of science
fed into the new technologies. Intellectual life emphasized the claims
of reason over traditional authority. Political systems made the
transition from absolutism to democracy. This was the common
background.”
(Kay, pp.37-51)
“Economic life is a set
of transactions, within a framework of rules. Some of the transactions
are contractual, some informal. Some of the rules are legal, others are
expectations about behaviour.... We acquire legal rights, in a market
economy, by statute (a relationship between the individual and the
state) or by contract (a relationship between two individuals). This
distinction loosely parallels the distinction between property rights
and exchanges, between rules and transactions. But most transactions in
a market economy are governed by expectations and conventions, not the
law, [as] we are rarely conscious of making contracts...[and] the costs
of writing individual contracts, and using legal mechanisms to enforce
them, are prohibitive for most transactions. And the law follows rather
than leads the behaviour of buyers and sellers, [as] it requires us
to...fulfil reasonable expectations. The rules, laws, and conventions
that govern our economic lives have evolved over thousands of years,
and they evolved in different ways in different places.... Different
continents, different circumstances, different coevolutions.”
(Kay, pp.52-5)
“Many economists talk
about the rules of a market economy as a distribution of property
rights, but the development of market institutions involved far more
than the invention of property rights, and many modern market
institutions are far too complex and subtle to be easily described in
terms of property.... [Moreover,] the emphasis on property has a
conservative flavour...[yet] market economies must constantly evolve
new rules. The analogy with property is unhelpful: the best structures
will give encouragement to investment and innovation in new
technologies, just as dynamic societies of the past evolved new
structures for ownership rights in living animals and plants, developed
employment contracts, and invented limited liability companies. These
accompanied and allowed the historical development of agriculture, wage
labour, and large-scale industrial organization.”
(Kay, pp.60-1)
Which is where history as such comes in. Regular readers of this site
will be well aware of the value of multiple tellings of history -
drawing upon the different viewpoints of specialist disciplines - and
economics is certainly no exception, despite history’s shameful (and
clearly unscientific) neglect by neo-classical economists. Contrast,
for example, the following w/Jared Diamond on the advent of
agriculture...as a near-perfect illustration of why we genuinely need such multiple accounts, to begin to adequately grasp the historical...
“Agriculture developed
from population pressure and new technology. The institution of
employment developed for the same reasons...[yet] we are so accustomed
to jobs that we rarely think about the nature of the institution. Yet,
for most of economic history, jobs were unusual. And, outside rich
states, careers are still unusual, [as] few people have, or had, any
choice about the work they perform...[since] their economic lives were
- and are - almost completely determined by where they were born -
geographically and socially - and by the traditions and conventions of
the society in which they lived.... The shift by Cro-Magnons from
production for use to production for exchange was an institutional
innovation to rank with technical innovations such as the manufacture
of tools and the invention of the wheel. But only in today’s rich
states is most production for exchange. For most of history, and in
much of the world even today, the main economic activity is the
production of food for own use. And, throughout history, the allocation
of scarce resources between competing ends was determined by custom, or
by force. In a traditional society, decisions about what to produce,
and the division of what was produced, were barely decisions at all,
[as] each year followed the pattern of preceding years.... A customary
economic system is an alternative to either a market economy, or a
planned society - but a static one. Customary economics had little
capacity to deal with change, and offered little encouragement to
initiate change.”
(Kay, pp.55-66)
“It is common to think
of exchange as a process where one party wins at the expense of
another, and some exchanges are like that...[but,] whenever there are
differences in talent and a mutual desire for variety, there is the
possibility of a division of labour, and mutually beneficial
exchange.... [Therefore,] comparative advantage dictates that we should
focus on what we do best.... Economies from specialization, differences
in capabilities: these are the factors which lead to mutual gains from
trade.... Trade between corporations was once mainly based on the
benefits from specialization, and today relates much more to difference
in capabilities. [Interestingly,] trade between countries seems to have
evolved in the opposite direction.... Like trade between individuals,
trade between countries results from mutually reinforcing differences
in capabilities and specialization...acquired over time, and are
embedded in the cultures which gave rise to them. The world’s most
productive economy - Switzerland - relies on exports of precision
engineering and speciality chemicals, which...have nothing to to with
the Swiss climate or terrain.... Capabilities and specialization have
reinforced each other, in a process of coevolution...[and since these]
depend on past choices, forgotten or now irrelevant historical events
still influence the location of production today.... Films are rarely
made in California any more, but Hollywood remains the centre of the
world film industry.”
(Kay, pp.67-73)
As Kay insistently continues to remind us, history is actually the key
to economic success - bound up as the latter is with the complex
co-evolution of institutions and cultures. In consequence, simplistic
denunciations of “command and control” mechanisms are out of place - as
are the dreams of free-market utopians. For all such mechanisms are flawed - and each has virtues if applied at the correct scale, and to the right ends.
“Two types of mechanism
define the ways goods can be assigned in an economic system. One type
is political, hierarchical, and personalized: the mechanism of
complaint is voice. The other is market-based, decentralized,
anonymous: the mechanism of complaint is exit. Each of these approaches
has merits and disadvantages...[and] both processes are open to
corruption.... To allocate scarce resources between competing ends, it
is necessary to assess what abilities are - what it is possible to
produce - and what needs are.... But, almost all this information has
to be obtained from the various proponents of the competing ends....
[In consequence,] investment appraisals put to the senior managers of
large businesses are always optimistic, and the business plans which
utilities show their regulators are always gloomy.... [And] obtaining
the information needed to plan production encounters similar
problems...[for] it was above all on...information and incentives that
the Soviet economy foundered, and the information problem is the more
fundamental.... Lenin claimed to have found the answer to this problem:
‘Seize the decisive link.’... But these are subject to ‘Goodheart’s
Law’ - any measure adopted as a target changes its meaning.... If
corporate executives receive bonuses related to earnings per share,
then earnings per share will rise, but whether the business is better,
or more valuable, is another question. Political decisions suffer acute
problems of incentive compatibility, [and] these may not only produce
bad answers to the assignment problem, but also undermine the integrity
of political decision-making itself.”
(Kay, pp.78-86)
“Centralization,
conformity to internally generated values, too much authority seized by
leaders whose adjutants derive no advantage from telling the truth, are
inescapable in very large organizations.... [Conversely,] markets work
because there is never a single voice.... It is tempting to believe
that if we entrusted the future...to the right people, they would lead
us unerringly to the promised land. [But] such hopes are always
disappointed. Most of Thomas Edison’s inventions did not work, [both]
Ford...and Mao ended their careers as sad, even risible figures....
But, because most decisions are wrong and most experiments fail, it is
also tempting to believe that we could manage businesses and states
better if only we assembled sufficient information and cleverer people,
and debated the issues at length. This is how decision-making is
supposed to be in the public sector, and in many large
organizations.... But nobody has such foresight.... Because the world
is complicated, and the future uncertain, decision-making in
organizations and economic systems is best made through a series of
small-scale experiments, frequently reviewed, and in a structure in
which success is followed up, and failure recognized but not blamed:
the mechanism of disciplined pluralism.... Both within organizations
and outside them, it is in the combination of pluralism and discipline
that we find the truth about markets.”
(Kay, pp.98-108)
This is a good point at which to pause, and take stock of Kay’s
pluralism. His discussion here, for example, takes in Hayek’s key
insight into the role of markets as information processors, Hirschman
on exit & voice, and Schumpeter on pluralism - all enriching (and,
most importantly, qualifying) Adam Smith’s basic insight re markets.
The result tells us a lot about the role of institutions in the real
world - as opposed to the world as modelled - and helps bring into
focus much that we have already observed for ourselves. Moreover, the
further you read, the more coherent and fair-minded Kay’s approach
seems...for he refuses to gloss over the real problems of any system in
operation:
“In rich states, we are
so accustomed to the absence of surpluses and shortages that we feel
angry when we encounter them.... Market economies have solved the
co-ordination problem more successfully than centrally planned ones.
This discovery astonished Khrushchev, and it should astonish us. Many
of the failures of planned economies were failures of innovation, [as]
the pluralist programme of experiment, failure, and fresh experiment
did not occur.... But the greatest failures of centrally planned
economies were in co-ordination...[and] for the casual visitor,
failures of co-ordination are one of the most obvious differences
between rich and poor countries. The electricity supply is often
unreliable, some essential goods are not available. This is sometimes
the result of poverty, but also a cause.... [However,] rich states are
not free of co-ordination failures...[and] the most serious...in
productive economies is unemployment, a...failure that planned
economies have largely avoided, although at the price of other
co-ordination failures elsewhere.”
(Kay, pp.111-13)
“In a perfectly
competitive market, the price of goods and the features of goods will
correspond to the value buyers attach to them. This is the basis for
using market prices to achieve commensurability....[However,] the
obvious problem is that the value people attach to particular goods or
services is the result not just of how much they want those goods or
services, but also how much money they have...[so] the legitimacy of
market values [for this purpose] depends on the legitimacy of the
income distribution.”
(Kay, p.177)
Which is where the modelling comes in - along with the utopian
assumptions. However, by beginning his discussion of same w/the flower
market at San Remo - which regulates behaviour/rents space, but does not impose any form of price controls - Kay reminds us of exactly why such
commodity markets are theoretically important...because they
demonstrate the very real possibilities of self-organization and
self-regulation, and certainly not because all social intercourse could
be regulated by such means:
“If no-one has much
influence over the price in a competitive market, how is the price
determined? In one sense, prices are not fixed at all...[but] a
spontaneous order is formed every day.... Most traders attend
every day, and use their experience to judge the level of stocks and
the level of demand. They judge each other, too: some traders will be
particularly influential...[as] activism by skilled traders determines
the price. [However,] trading at San Remo is about as close to a
perfectly competitive market as we find, [since] no individual buyer or
seller has much influence over price. And trading at San Remo is also
close to being incentive compatible. There is rarely much to be gained
by strategic behaviour...[as] subtle ways of beating the market are
hard to devise, and likely to backfire. And concern for reputation with
fellow traders also encourages incentive compatibility....
[Unfortunately, however] once buyers or sellers are sufficiently large
for their behaviour to influence the price, they start behaving
strategically.... [So] once products become differentiated and sellers
have sufficient market share to influence price, the problem of setting
price and managing demand is very different, and more complex. And
co-ordination may actually be more difficult, as anyone who has
experienced an overbooked flight knows.”
(Kay, pp.131-8)
“The concept of
spontaneous order - the idea that complex systems may have properties
of self-organization - is powerful: but the knowledge that self
organization is possible falls a long way short of either demonstrating
that co-ordination happens spontaneously, or explaining how it might
happen spontaneously. Competitive markets...produce their own local
equilibrium, which equates supply and demand...[which] solves part of
the co-ordination problem, but only part, [for] the remarkable feature
of the market economy is that it seems to solve a large variety of
co-ordination problems simultaneously.... Central planners always found
it easy to deal with any particular co-ordination problem...[but] the
trouble is...when we solve one problem, we almost always create another
elsewhere.”
(Kay, p.159)
“Neoclassical
[economic] theory is elegant and, in a sense, comprehensive. But it
cannot be the end of our search for the truth about markets. It is not
that it is wrong, or even irrelevant: many practical insights into how
markets work emerge both from the analysis of individual markets, and
from the theory of competitive equilibrium. It is just that it is not
enough.... [Economics Nobel laureate] Gary Becker’s assertion that ‘the
combined assumptions of maximizing behavior, market equilibrium, and
stable preferences, used relentlessly and unflinchingly, form the heart
of the economic approach’ is, on reflection, extraordinary. Why should
‘the economic approach’ rest on specific empirical assumptions about
behaviour, especially when these assumptions are, at best, partially
true? The thoughtful economist, like the trained physicist or skilled
doctor, will use whatever techniques and assumptions are appropriate to
the task at hand, and expect different assumptions and techniques to be
appropriate to different tasks. Economics is not theology, but a means
of understanding...[and] the limited truth about markets which emerges
from the perfectly competitive model provides a base for further
exploration - no more, no less.”
(Kay, p.190-9)
“The Chicagoean
emphasis on rationality is taken to extreme lengths. But, it is [still]
almost a badge of honour among mainstream economists to seek
explanations in rational or self-regarding behaviour, [and] often, this
is achieved by stretching the meaning of rationality...[which] is
generally used by economists in one or other of two senses: rationality
as consistency, and rationality as self-regarding materialism. Neither
of these corresponds to the ordinary meaning of the word ‘rational’....
Economists insist on rationality because they do not like the
alternatives. Self-regarding materialism is a better predictor of
behaviour than altruism...[but] reality is somewhere in between. Such
reality is necessarily complex, however. There are few ways to be
rational, but many ways in which it is possible to be
irrational...[and] self-regarding materialism is predictable...[so]
that conclusions can be drawn from wholly a priori reasoning. No empirical investigation required.... [But] behaviour is a
product of the environment in which people find themselves...[and] the
explanation is found in path-dependency and adaptation.... Evolution
favours what is good at replicating itself, rather than what is good,
[and] this fundamental distinction is essential to understanding any
evolving system.... The phenomenon of self-regarding, self-perpetuating
selection mechanisms is common in the public sector, but can equally be
found in private sector monopolies.... [However,] reality must be faced
if there is a level of selection which reviews output, rather than
procedure.... [Conversely,] organizations which face no competition, or
have no mechanisms for responding to it, may continue such behaviour
for extended periods...[for] adaptive behaviour, by definition, is
self-sustaining and self-reinforcing.”
(Kay, pp.201-9)
As Kay shows us, there is no technical/economic escape from the ethical
- merely some highly useful guides as to the traps we fall into when we
ignore incentives. This should hardly be surprising, were it not for
the (purely ideological) successes of economic technocrats, who managed
to privilege narrowly-defined efficiency to the point that substantive
questions of ends became (for awhile) almost illegitimate in policy
deliberations. But, as we’re now seeing, assumptions of perfect markets
are almost never justified, whilst a modest and pluralistic viewpoint
such as Kay’s seems ever more prescient by the day...
“Social behaviour needs
to be understood in many dimensions, and at many levels...[and] there
is no incompatibility, and no need to choose between these elements of
thick description. The economic imperialism which seeks to ‘explain’
all behaviour by reference to rational choice is absurd, but so is a
purely anthropological account which denies or disregards the economic
functions of social practices. The Arrow-Debreu [general competitive
equilibrium] model is not a grand narrative, providing a ‘true’
description of the world, but a particularly elaborate and
sophisticated little story, shedding light on the possibility of
spontaneous order in complex economic systems. [In fact,] the very
clarity and simplicity of the...model demonstrates its weakness.
Indeed, its creators understood very well that a primary purpose of
their analysis was to spell out the elaborate and extensive assumptions
needed to make that version of spontaneous order coherent. Economic
research since Arrow and Debreu has drawn game theory, transaction
costs, and most recently behavioral economics into the mainstream of
economic theory. In the Arrow-Debreu framework, interactions are
anonymous, and there are many buyers and sellers in every market. In
game theory, the players are not anonymous, and there are few of them.
In the Arrow-Debreu model, institutions do not exist, or are dealt with
in a reductionist way. Institutional or transactions-cost economics
recognizes that economic lives are lived in and through economic
institutions.... [However, while] neoclassical economics was enhanced
both by game theory and by transactions-costs economics...neoclassical
rationality assumptions were imposed on both. The transactions-cost
solution...is that the economist should optimize within constraints....
[But,] how could the economist know when to stop calculating, when he
cannot know the benefits of further calculation? If we knew enough to
be boundedly rational, we would know enough to be completely rational.
The best answer is an evolutionary one: but such an answer leads us to
adaptive, instinctive responses.... We apply conventions and rules of
thumb, that generally serve us well. Some are probably genetic, some
the product of learning, imitation, and reward, some universal, some
culturally specific, [and] we occasionally apply these rules in
situations where they do not work for us - many so-called
irrationalities are of this kind.... We behave adaptively in our
economic lives, and the institutions in which we act these lives are
themselves adaptive...[and] have coevolved.”
(Kay, pp.194-211)
“Modern economies
require, and obtain, more co-operation than can be explained either by
coercion or by reciprocity.... This behaviour is not rational, if
rationality means self-regarding materialism. But it is adaptive -
societies in which people help strangers are not only nicer, but more
prosperous...[and] public goods will not be produced by self-regarding
individuals in competitive markets.... Social institutions, mainly
government, provide a range of public goods - the police, street
cleaning, national defense, a framework of rules and laws - [for
which]...no one who refuses to contribute can be excluded. For a
broader category of goods, it is possible but undesirable to exclude
those who refuse to contribute. Perhaps it is more costly to set up
mechanisms of exclusion than to allow universal access....perhaps
exclusion is undesirable because everyone benefits from general
provision, [or] perhaps exclusion would violate norms about the kind of
society we want.... [Still,] these goods must be provided in productive
economies, and also paid for...so the level of provision of public
goods is rarely decided dispassionately.”
(Kay, pp.237-40)
“This is not to deny
that self-interested materialism is an important feature of economic
life. [and that] economic systems based on appeals to work for the
common good will fail. But self interest is necessarily hedged in by
the complex institutions of modern economic, social, and political life
- formal regulation and implicit rules, mechanisms of reputation and
co-ordination, instincts and structures of co-operation, feelings of
solidarity. Without [these]...there will be chaos. [For] modern
societies did not develop ethical norms which limit and deplore
self-regarding materialism out of a perverse desire to restrain
entrepreneurial spirits. Economic motivations are complex,
multi-faceted, and not necessarily consistent. The study of human
behaviour is an empirical subject, [and] it cannot rely solely on
introspection and a priori assumptions. Still less should it rely on introspection and a priori assumptions that do not correspond to experience. The best
starting-point is to expect that behaviour will be adaptive - that
people will behave in the way they are normally expected to in the
circumstances in which they find themselves. [But] this expectation
will sometimes be false, [for] economies would not develop otherwise.”
(Kay, pp.316-7)
“We are usually more
productive when we work in co-operative teams...[as] humans are among
the most social of species, [and] this sociability is fundamental to
our economic organization.... Through team working, we can make use of
the division of labour, and exploit gains from specialization and
differences in capabilities...[and] by sharing information and pooling
risks. [In addition,] public goods require co-operative
behaviour.... [Thus,] when there are large gains to be made from
co-operative behaviour, an instinct to form and enforce co-operative
groups is advantageous, not just for the group, but for each individual
member. It is also advantageous - in cold-blooded evolutionary terms -
to be naturally co-operative, to sweat, blush, and avoid the eyes of
our colleagues when we make promises we do not intend to keep, [as]
these characteristics make it possible for colleagues to trust us....
[And] competition in business and economics mostly does take place at
the level of the group.... [Still,] the provision of public goods
benefits from both solidarity and competition, and these are not always
easy to reconcile.... For all of them, the social context of the
transaction is vital.”
(Kay, pp.241-8)
While behavioral economics is clearly the most challenging to
neo-classical assumptions, it is important to understand the basics of
the other main contributions as well, since they all have real value in
re-assessing different areas of economic theory - as Kay’s discussion
of risk markets (see derivatives, anyone?) makes perfectly clear...
“Institutional (or
transactions-cost) economics regards as its founder Ronald
Coase...[whose] thesis was that the boundaries of firms - islands of
organization in a sea of markets - were determined by the balance
between the costs of alternative systems. Transactions costs in markets
[absent in the general equilibrium model] must be set against the
problems of incentive compatibility within organizations. Is it cheaper
to hire someone and tell them what to do, or negotiate contracts with
potential suppliers? This make or buy decision is a central issue for
every business.”
(Kay, p.196)
“Imperfect information
changes everything. In perfectly competitive markets, exchange is
anonymous. But, in markets with imperfect information, the identity of
the trader is a key element of the exchange. In perfectly competitive
markets, price equates supply and demand, but in markets with imperfect
information, price is a means for sellers to communicate with buyers,
and because it serves this function it may fail to equate supply and
demand. In perfectly competitive markets, all exchanges are efficient,
and only efficient exchanges occur. But in markets with imperfect
information, exchanges occur which buyers regret [particularly under
the so-called ‘winner’s curse’], and trades which would benefit both
buyers and sellers may not happen. Yet market economies have been
resilient, even ingenious, in developing mechanisms for dealing with
problems of imperfect information, [and] to recognize [its] ubiquity is
not to mount a critique of market economies, but rather a critique of
the adequacy of the perfectly competitive model as a description of how
market economies work. The truth about markets is much more complex.”
(Kay, p.223)
“Markets in risk are
particularly subject to imperfect information, and vulnerable to
‘irrational’ behaviour. In fact, most trading in risk markets comes
from one or both of these sources, while the same combination of
factors ensures that many necessary-risk markets never come into being.
[Firstly,] our attitudes to uncertainty are born of a mixture of hopes
and fears, grounded in instincts and social conditioning, [and] our
reactions to risk are often intuitive.... [Moreover,] asymmetric
information pervades risk markets...[with] markets for life and medical
insurance...possible [only] because medical knowledge is still
rudimentary.... This is the tip of a large iceberg...[and] in fifty
years time, private medical and life insurance may be as difficult to
obtain as divorce and unemployment insurance today, and for the same
reasons.... When people can opt out, adverse selection is a problem,
[and] if what they’re doing can’t easily be watched, moral hazard is a
problem. The combination...means that risks are best managed by groups
which have other communal bonds, typically families, communities,
workplaces and nations...[and] purely economic agencies, such as
insurance companies and securities markets play only a minor role. Risk
sharing in social groups is effective because there are many different
advantages to participation in these groups, and also because
solidarity and sense of obligation come into play. The traditional
marriage vow - for richer for poorer, for better, for worse - could
hardly be more explicit in identifying risk sharing as characteristic
of the relationship.... Communities can be effective providers of
medical insurance, [and] employers can be effective providers of
unemployment insurance, [as] they are far less vulnerable to problems
of moral hazard than either private insurers, or the state: who could
be better placed to judge an employee’s commitment to work? And the
issue of adverse selection simply does not arise. For most of the
twentieth century, large businesses did provide such insurance, not as
a formal contract, but as a mutual expectation...[that] there would
always be a job The consequence was that the employer took much of the
risk...[and] the employee paid a price.... In the last two decades of
the [previous] century, many of these implicit contracts were broken
[and] the long-run effect is that government is now the only credible
supplier of unemployment insurance.... [Unfortunately,] government is
well placed to reduce adverse selection because it can compel
participation, but is less effective at reducing moral hazard than the
social pressures of a local community.”
(Kay, pp.224-32)
“Economic policies
based on abstract blueprints and imposed by government are rarely
effective, [but] this is not to say that there is no role for
government, or that only institutions which develop spontaneously can
be effective. Policy results from the interaction of norms and values,
and is part of a subtle relationship between private and social
institutions, and the powers and resources of the state. This complex
approach to economic policy making...denies the social democratic
premise that the only legitimate source of economic authority is
democratic election.... However, it is fundamental to the success of
market economies that power is dispersed in this pluralist way.
[Conversely,] a supporter of the ABM would be suspicious of the
imposition of...obligations on employers.... [And,] in regulating
corporate America, the prescriptive approach - which allowed players
freedom within rules - failed, [as] the rules did not so much exclude
the unacceptable as define the limits of the permissible. In complex,
democratic societies, rules are implementable only if they define
behaviour which most people would adopt in any event. That is why the
approach of allowing maximum freedom within a framework of rules is
bound to fail - and did.... Incentive compatibility and adaptive
behaviour explain why this is so. The integrity of an institution is
not the product of its governance structure, but of the values of those
who work within it, [and] many different value systems will be
supported by adaptive, self-reinforcing behaviour. If institutions are
designed on the assumption that individuals are self-interested,
self-interested behaviour will be adaptive within them. [And] if the
premise is that people are not to be trusted, that expectation will be
fulfilled. Self-interested behaviour by managers of large companies is
corrosive of the integrity of companies, just as self-interested
behaviour by government officials is corrosive of the integrity of
government. The central premise of the ABM - that economic life is, or
could be, successfully organized around the instrumental behaviour of
self-regarding materialists, constrained only by externally imposed
rules - is mistaken, and the mistake threatens both the viability and
legitimacy of market systems. In both politics and business, the rise
of the ABM created the very problem of controlling self-interest it
purported to solve.”
(Kay, pp.341-7)
Which is well worth underlining, lest we get ourselves into this fix
again. Moreover, once we have ruled out simplistic “greed is good”
thinking, there are a variety of subtle - and not so subtle - changes
we need to consider in basic economic policy...which will require
rethinking across the ideological spectrum, not just on the right. As
Kay explains:
“Market economies are
not about harnessing greed, and the elevation of greed as their
dominant value undermined them. Market economies succeeded because they
established disciplined pluralism, and put in place mechanisms which
solved, or at least reduced, problems of incentive compatibility. The
twin pillars of disciplined pluralism and incentive compatibility
should support economic policy. [Unfortunately,] disciplined pluralism
is contrary to the natural instincts of most political and business
leaders...[and] centralized structures cannot cope easily with the
normal fact of economic life, that it is very difficult to determine
what the right thing to do is, and the best recourse is to try many
things on a small scale, and see which few work. [Also,] pluralism
necessarily conflicts with uniformity. But if government structures
genuinely allow pluralism and decentralized authority, variability in
the quality of what is provided is inevitable.... [Overall,] the
objective should not be to introduce measures which bear superficial
resemblance to the management systems of private sector businesses into
the public sector, but to understand sufficiently well how market
disciplines work to make it possible to introduce within the public
sector systems which have analogous effects.”
(Kay, pp.355-7)
“Most rich states have
policies to maintain competition. But competition policies are often
predicated on the assumption that the world should be aligned with the
perfectly competitive model.... [Conversely,] disciplined pluralism
implies that rivals pursue differentiated strategies, and the more
successful of them earn rents, [so] competition policy should not seek
to eliminate these rents: if it tries, it will diminish pluralism. The
purposes of competition policy are to promote pluralism and make
discipline effective.... [Similarly,] the case against price controls,
tariffs, subsidies and tax breaks is not that the market always gets it
right, [but that] the direct consequences of these policies are always
to benefit the rent-seeking group directly, and the indirect
consequences impossible to determine. There should be a strong
presumption against arguments which are based on generalized economic
benefits...from measures that are specific to an industry...[in
contrast] to specific, largely non-economic, aspects of the nature of
society. These issues can be be debated, but arguments for such
intervention cannot be rebutted by generalized claims about the merits
of free markets.... Good rules cannot be made by general principle:
solutions are usually specific to technology and a market.”
(Kay, pp.364-75)
“Markets work, but not
always, and not perfectly. Pluralist market structures promote
innovation, and competitive markets meet many consumer needs, but there
is no general reason to believe that market outcomes are efficient....
In the perfectly competitive model, and the simplicities of the ABM, it
is obvious what the rules of a market economy should be, and easy to
enforce them.... [However,] market economies have been successful
relative to other societies precisely because the rules that govern
them are not obvious to frame and easy to implement, and rich states
have evolved complex governance structures embedded in other modern
social and political institutions.... In addition, the distribution of
income and wealth, and the process by which that distribution is
established must, like the structure of market institutions itself,
enjoy legitimacy if the market economy is to survive and evolve.... The
embedded market describes the successful market systems of Western
Europe - and the reality of the United States. It does not function
within a minimal state: productive economies have the largest,
most powerful, and most influential governments the world has ever
seen.... The job of government under the ABM is to define and enforce
the rules of the market economy. The economic role of a social
democratic government is to determine, through the democratic process,
how society wishes scarce resources to be allocated between competing
ends, and to direct the activities of businesses and households in
order to bring that allocation about. Neither of these models describe
the function of government accurately. The complex institutions of the
market economy developed largely without central direction, and are
constantly evolving. Government is an agent in that evolution, not a
bystander, but government cannot control the process, and should not
seek to.”
(Kay, pp.337-40)
“Socialism failed,
because it substituted centralized direction for disciplined pluralism,
and because it could not handle issues of incentive compatibility.
Government agencies and large businesses face exactly these problems.
Indeed, the ways in which capitalist economies fail are often similar
to the ways in which socialist economies fail.... Firms in a market
engage in market research, but they learn principally from the choices
consumers make. These answers are reliable and definitive (unlike the
results of market research), [for] the market economy is a discovery
process which both reveals information, and reduces the need for it....
Whenever competitive mechanisms are not available, or not used, there
are potential problems of incentive compatibility, [and] the common
response is to set targets, and reward or punish by reference to the
targets.... So managers aim to meet the targets, not the objectives....
The contractualization approach has been applied not just between the
public and private sector, but within the public sector itself...[but]
these mechanisms produce appearances of market disciplines without
substance. Real contracts...are voluntary, mutually beneficial
agreements between autonomous agents. And it is only possible to make
such agreements where there are credible alternatives for both buyers
and sellers.... These arrangements often attempt to shed
responsibility, but not authority.... The alternative is to try to
align the interests of the various players, [and] outside the American
business model, this is not so hard.... The objective is not to design
institutions that are robust to self-interest, but to stimulate
elements of behaviour that are not purely self-interested....[However,]
autonomy is only possible in conjunction with the process of audit and
selection, and these function most effectively in conditions of
disciplined pluralism.”
(Kay, pp.353-5)
With pluralism - rather than simple competition - of the highest value,
Kay’s markets are not quite those we expected. However, in stressing
ends rather than means, he returns economics to where it should have stayed in the first place...as one of the moral sciences -
pluralist in theory, and disciplined by empiricism, rather than
by adherence to a particular model. For, the simple fact is that the
model was always self-evidently inadequate in the face of the
evidence...
“At the start of the
twenty-first century, the American business model (ABM) plays the role
in political economy that socialism enjoyed for for so long. All
political positions, even hostile ones, are defined by their
relationship to it...[and,] like religious or political
fundamentalists, market fundamentalists regard the precepts of the ABM
as self-evident, and inevitable...[and] if the the magic has not
worked, it is because the subjects did not believe in it enough....
[However,] economic policies should be ranked by reference to relative
economic performance...[and] GDP per head, or per hour of work, is the
obvious starting-point. Economic stability - perhaps measured by
inflation and unemployment - is clearly relevant; so are the quality of
the environment and public infrastructure. Taking these criteria
together, Norway and Switzerland are probably the world’s most
successful economies. It doesn’t really matter what the answer is: the
key point is that it is not immediately obvious that the world’s
best-performing economy is the United States of America, [and] a search
for countries characterized by overriding self-interest, market
fundamentalism, the minimal state, and low taxation would not begin in
Norway, or end in Switzerland. Economic history decisively demonstrates
the superiority of market economies over centrally planned regimes,
[but] it fails to demonstrate the superiority of any particular
model...[and] the embedded markets of Norway and Switzerland are
particularly idiosyncratic.”
(Kay, pp.307-11)
“[Moreover,] difference
in capital per head is only a small part of the story. Without changes
in the organization of land holding, without a reorganization of social
relationships, without an educational revolution and without the
infrastructure - from roads to repairmen - needed for different methods
of production, imported capital could never be usefully employed....
Output is a function not just of capital and labour, but of
institutions, in industrial sectors as in the traditional economy....
[Moreover,] natural resource endowments may actually damage economic
development, because these resources distort the structure of economic
institutions.... Some rich states - Norway and Iceland - have managed
bountiful resource endowments well, others - like Switzerland and Japan
- may have benefited from their absence. Tom Friedman, the herald of
globalization, notes a still greater paradox. Sub-Saharan Africa is the
place to find societies characterized by unrestrained greed and weak
government: ‘Come to Africa - it’s a freshman Republican’s paradise.
Yes sir, nobody in Liberia pays taxes. There’s no gun control in
Angola. There’s no welfare as we know it in Burundi, and no big
government to interfere in the market in Rwanda. But a lot of their
people sure wish there were.... [Furthermore,] while there are elements
of truth in dependency theory...the different economic experiences of
Australia and Argentina do not originate in differences in
relationships between these peripheral economies and Europe, but in the
economic, social, and political institutions of the peripheral
countries themselves.... [And, while] it is easy to romanticize life in
what we consider primitive societies, agriculture...normally involves
long days of backbreaking toil. The myth of Shangri-la is an enduring
image in Western thought, and few descriptions survive critical
scrutiny. It remains true, however, that our economic lives are not our
only lives and happiness comes from the range of our experiences, not
the quantity of material goods found in our houses.”
(Kay, pp.269-77)
John Kay’s The Truth About Markets (2004) is the finest survey of the broad sweep of current economic
work’s implications for our basic economic understanding, and his
discussion of greed and risk markets seems eerily prescient given the
financial crisis of four years later. Nevertheless, it is not for
prophesy that I particularly commend this book. Rather, it is for the
balance between down to earth questions/examples - the latter I have
saved for the final quote below - and a rich theoretical pluralism
which is unafraid to venture beyond the typical bounds of economic
theory. If there is one aspect of same relatively neglected by Kay,
interestingly enough, it is the application of chaos theory to
macroeconomics - making Paul Ormerod’s Death of Economics (1994) a perfect complement. Hopefully, as the false certainties of
neo-classical ideology die away, our policymakers will have the sense
to work within this more open, yet modest, approach, and learn - as the
left are now beginning - to genuinely distrust the siren-songs of
utopia...
“Heidi ($2,500) is a
school teacher in Switzerland, Sven ($1,700) a farm worker in Sweden,
Ivan ($900) a telecommunication engineer in Moscow, and Ravi ($320) an
accountant with the State Bank of India. The figures in brackets are
their monthly earnings. Although a dollar buys more in India than in
Switzerland - purchasing power parities differ from official exchange
rates - their earnings correctly rank their material standards of
living. Heidi is best off, followed by Sven, Ivan, and Ravi. Why?
There are productivity theories and bargaining theories of income
distribution...[and] productivity theories appeal to the rich.... If
they take out a lot, it is because they have put more in. Bargaining
theories appeal to the poor, [as] they can blame their status on the
unfair organization of society.... The right won the cold war and the
left lost, so productivity theories have the upper hand today...but,
can these theories explain the different economic lives of Heidi and
Ivan, Ravi and Sven? ....[Unfortunately,] productivity theories and
bargaining theories are both inadequate...however, a synthesis helps
towards the answer...in the theory of economic rent. Many rents are the
product of scarce talents in individuals, or competitive advantages in
firms; some reflect arbitrage gains of securities houses, or the
rent-seeking activities of successful lobbyist, [so] the creation of
rents is the result of a combination of productivity and
bargaining...[and] most rents in modern economics are the product of
teams, or can only be exploited through teams. The distribution of
rents within teams is [again] the result of a combination of individual
productivity and internal bargaining. [And,] the most important
influence on our incomes is the teams we belong to.... These teams
include the residents of the Canton of Zurich, the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries, the shareholders and employees of
Wal-Mart stores, the family of the late Sam Walton, the citizens of
Brunei, and its ruling family, the executive directors of the Disney
Corporation.... The more exclusive the club, the more valuable the
membership.... [Conversely,] Sicelo [- a South African subsistence
farmer -] is a member of almost no economic teams, barely deriving
benefit even from the division of labour, [and] Ravi and Ivan are
members of fewer teams [than Heidi & Sven], and some of these are
ineffective: because of poor internal organization, or because they are
not directed to the relevant social and economic objectives.”
(Kay, pp.280-94)
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