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Melvin Konner:
The Tangled Wing:
biological
constraints on the human spirit
(W.H Freeman: 2002)
“In 1846, Gustave
Flaubert wrote, in a letter to poet Louise Colet, ‘As
a rule, the philosopher is a kind of mongrel being, a
cross between scientist and poet, envious of both.’
It is sad to say that many behavioral and social theorists
are like Flaubert’s philosophers. They are almost
immune to criticism. When their facts or logic are challenged
they hide behind a cloak of humanism. Yet they expect
to be taken much more seriously than poets because they
are not, after all, offering mere deftly worded sentiment
but presume to draw on a large body of science. This is
a pretty treacherous middle ground.... [For] the great
literary figures, past and present, have had much more
in common with the view of human nature taken by biologists
than with that of human potential taken by social scientists.
Thus, it is almost as amusing as it is unjust for the
latter to decry biologists as technicians while they try
to hide behind the cloak of humanism; for them it is a
tattered cloak indeed, affording scant cover and, in the
long term, no safe disguise. Despite their dim view of
human nature, many - though certainly not all - [great
literary figures] were critics of the societies they lived
in and even of the governments that ran them. But they
were skeptical of proposals for change, especially grand
schemes.... [For,] unlike children, who stumble endearingly
over themselves before they wreak much havoc, we do the
real-world work of our besotted, arcane emotions after
slower deliberation, in loftier grandeur, using subtler
indirection, out of a deeper, more vengeful vein of selfishness,
and with more power.”
(Konner, pp.471-5)
In 1982, a young anthropologist & poet named Melvin
Konner produced the first version of The
Tangled Wing. The critical consensus then acclaimed
it as the best written, best argued, and most balanced
survey of what Konner termed “behavioral biology”
- a substantially broader and much less polemical field
than E.O. Wilson’s “sociobiology” -
and it remained so for many years, despite the rapidity
of scientific advance. Now, twenty years later - and after
a laborious process lasting several years - we have a
new edition, entirely revised throughout.
And, yes...it is still
by far the best book in the field. Beautifully written,
exhaustively researched, and scrupulously fair to the
truly enormous range of evidence relevant to the enquiry,
The Tangled Wing
remains the work humanists need to encounter if they wish
to take the idea of human nature seriously again, as was
near-universal before the last century.
Herein, in addition to a truly enormous array of research
findings, the reader will find a skilled guide to this
highly contested area, who refuses the usual simplifications
practiced by both sides - and insists, moreover, on combining
humanistic (particularly literary) perspectives with those
of science. The result is an enriched, rather than impoverished,
view of human nature; complex, nuanced, and the very opposite
of that bland “compromise” which offends no-one.
Because the questions are far too important for that...
“We need simple,
clear explanations; we are busy. But the answers must
also be comprehensive. Simple, clear, comprehensive explanations.
We have no time for endless academic musings, or for a
litany of facts. We need theories that are incisive and
illuminating, that enable us to grasp the solution at
once, that transcend the complexities, paring away all
irrelevancies, leaving only the elegant, decisive beauty
of a Euclidian proof, the first paradigm of our intellectual
training. I offer no such theories. It is my belief that
the failure of behavioral science up to the present day
results precisely from the pursuit of them. Classical
economics, Marxism, psychoanalysis, learning theory, instinct
theory, cognitive theory, structuralism, artificial intelligence,
neural network modeling, chaos and complexity theory,
sociobiology - not a single one of them false in its essence,
but each one false in its ambitions, and especially false
in its condemnation of the others.... For the lay person,
the difficulty of integrating this breadth of knowledge
into a larger picture of ourselves is daunting.... Scientists,
too, are daunted by the effort to keep up. In the old
cliche, they find out more and more about less and less
until they know everything about nothing. But today, the
problem is that we know more and more about more and more.
And although we will never know everything about everything,
the time will come when we know so much that no one person
can hope to know all the essential facts about, say, violence
or anxiety, needed to make a single wise decision....
[So,] every so often we must stop and see what we know...[and,]
for those who do not share the conviction that bits of
knowledge laid end to end lead to wisdom, the articulation
of the bits becomes a challenge separate from that of
unearthing them. When the knowledge in question is knowledge
about human behavior, the emergent image must bear a human
face.”
(Konner, pp.xv-xvi)
For those who still associate such work with prejudice
and psuedo-science, Konner makes this counter-claim, which
concisely summarizes the modern scientific consensus on
race, prejudice and human universals. And it is one that
cultural anthropology is, even now, starting to come around
to:
“The overwhelming
genetic unity of our species becomes clearer all the time.
We are, every one of us, descended from a very small group
of people who lived in Africa around 100,000 years ago.
During almost all that time, challenges to intelligence
have been remarkably similar on every continent. There
has been little or no opportunity for racial separation,
and the physical variety that seems so obvious to us is
just an intersection of geographic trend lines known as
clines, each a gradient of variation along a particular
dimension, such as nose shape, height, or skin color.
You can point to any spot on earth, draw a circle around
it, and call it a race, but all you will have done is
arbitrarily label the local intersection of several of
these clines...[and] statistically, it has been repeatedly
shown that the vast majority of human genetic variation
occurs within, not between, ethnic groups.... Race is
the least interesting and least significant of biological
categories, yet it continues to compel the attention of
many people. The most likely explanation for this is not
the intrinsic merit of the subject. It is the desire to
simplify the world, to justify unfair treatment of minorities,
and to shore up a weak identity with a false sense of
superiority. Human beings characteristically dichotomize
the social world, and much of what is wrong with the world
stems from this fact of human nature.... Behavioral biology
is a strong, dangerous physic, potentially healing if
used appropriately, poisonous if not. For the great questions
of race and social class, it has far more relevance to
the behavior of the oppressors than it does to that of
the victims. It does not show that the oppressed are inferior,
but it does help explain why the oppressors are selfish,
greedy, and violent.”
(Konner, pp.495-6)
“Although the
main subject of cultural anthropology has been cross-cultural
variety, it has always had an inevitable, if tacit, complement:
things about human life that vary little or not at all.
But ‘universal’ has at least five different
meanings. First are things like upright walking or social
smiling, shown by all normal members of the species. Second
are acts universal to a given age or sex - the sucking
reflex in newborns, for instance, or the ejaculatory pattern
in adult males. Third, some universals affect all groups
but not all individuals, such as the sex difference in
physical fighting. A fourth group of universals applies
to culture instead of behavior, like taboos against incest
and in-group homicide, or the varied but always definable
bond of marriage. Last, there are things that are unusual
yet are found at some low level in every population, such
as homicide, suicide, depression, schizophrenia, or incest.
The lists in these five classes are long, much longer
than most anthropologists would have predicted...[and]
although the frequency or context of most behaviors varies,
the large, stable core proves that human nature is real.
Universals describe our nature. Yet traditional cultural
anthropologists, even when reluctantly accepting the existence
of universals, show little interest in them, deeming them
trivial or outside anthropology’s proper subject
matter. This is like being interested in differences in
diet but not in the way the gut works - fine for a chef,
but not very good for a scientist.”
(Konner, p.440)
“Every genetic
alteration is subject to reversal by an appropriate environmental
change - one that is either known or can be found out.
Nongenetic change can also mimic in various ways the effects
of a bad gene. The contrary belief, which holds that genes
are destiny and that proving a genetic effect is tantamount
to throwing up our hands, would be silly if it were not
both persistent and pernicious.... There is in each of
us a residue of traits of heart and mind that we brought
with us not just when we left the womb but indeed when
we entered it. The denial of this, as liberal as it sounds,
is really a denial of individuality, every bit as dangerous
as the most rigid genetic determinism.”
(Konner, p.90)
Unfortunately, the problems which stand in the way of
any serious attempt to grapple with human nature include
far more than historical prejudice and postmodern relativism.
As well, there is the grossly inaccurate psychic “plumbing”
of the Freudians, who have managed to impose their model
upon popular culture, to the detriment of genuine understanding;
“Good Old-Fashioned A.I”., with its top-down
symbolic processing that has nothing at all to do with
human thought; far-too-narrowly modular “evolutionary”
approaches, genetic determinism, and a host of other all-encompassing
schemes which make a habit of dismissing most of the evidence.
Luckily, neuroscience (in particular) is now beginning
to expose these for what they are, and, in consequence,
it will become much easier to exercise a little more discrimination
in our theoretical choices.
“The humours metaphor
of the Elizabethans is closer to the truth than is the
drive metaphor. The brain is not a hydraulic system. No
fluids in it build up under pressure, urging us to do
this or that action, relenting after we ‘let off
steam.’... Rather than building up pressure until
release occurs, action tendencies rise and fall with internal
and external causes, often without deprivation or release.
The terms we use [today] to describe them are nonmetaphoric
and epistemologically cautious, merely describing what
can be seen and measured. But they have one great advantage:
a plausible relationship to what goes on in brain and
body.”
(Konner, p.89)
“Artificial-intelligence
experts trying to model the brain as a general-purpose
computer should, in the early twenty-first century -
be feeling very uncomfortable.... [But] if you insist
upon the computer model, think, then, of a late-1970s
Tandy desktop computer somehow hopelessly yoked to a
Cray supercomputer, an early Macintosh, a Pentium multimedia-based
system, an old mechanical calculator, an abacus, and
a vast array of Webservers and software. DOS, MacOS,
Windows, Linux, Java, Bluetooth, and various WAP enablers
have no choice but to coexist, not just on a network
but on every single machine. Parts of this system would
do well to bypass the others, but they cannot. Aging,
rusted, even broken components stay and play their roles.
Now add all the things machines don’t have to
contend with: ongoing responsiveness to temperature,
humidity, time of day, the ebb and flow of various chemicals,
and, alas, parasites that constantly change the responsiveness
of some parts of the circuitry. Let the system learn,
but not through programming; experience modifies software
and hardware alike. Finally, make the system especially
impressionable for certain kinds of experience, corresponding
to love, lust, grief, fear, rage, disgust, resentment,
jealousy, and pain. This is the spit-and-chewing-gum
evolutionary mess that is the human brain, not a well-made
computer solving problems by iterating neat little algorithms.
And this mess is uniquely human. Future computers may
well think, but until they feel like bodies they will
not think like brains.”
(Konner, pp.142-3)
“Mental and behavioral
phenomena must find their brain location, not in a static
geography of locations, but a dynamic commerce of circuits.”
(Konner, p.127)
“Steroid hormones...may
not interfere with the machinery of heredity, but the
do regulate its expression, in the most intimate example
of gene-environment interaction. Here are genes whose
effect on the organism - on the very cell they inhabit
- is so far from fixed that it is vulnerable to the merest
winds of blood-borne humoral factors. That means that
anything in the environment that can influence, say, testosterone
- diet, stress, temperature, seduction, even fantasy -
can potentially toss a molecular wrench among the delicate
cogs of the gene machinery. So much for the fixed effects
of genes.”
(Konner, p.98)
The strong evidence makes nonsense of any simple model.
Genes are too few to dictate, environmental influences
start at fertilization, and the old guesses - particuarly
the rhetorically dominant ones - are looking more foolish
by the minute:
“At least twice
the number of embryonic neurons are born than are needed,
and the half that die do not die at random. Recall Changeux’s
paradox. [Thirty] thousand genes create a hundred billion
neurons with a hundred trillion connections. It can’t
be done from within, by a push-pull, click-click
sort of genetic control. Some of the early cells make
connections, and these connections supply nutrients that
help keep the cells alive while others die. Then synapses,
too, stabilize selectively. Most connections are pruned,
and the ones that persist are the most active - functional
synapses have an edge in the cellular struggle for survival.
Embryos are active very early, reacting to noise, flexing
their limbs, and sucking their thumbs; this activity shapes
brain circuits. Third, beyond cell death and pruning,
Gerald Edelman’s model of neural group selection
holds that functioning groups of nerve cells - local circuits
- form initially under genetic control, with little need
of experience. These are fairly fixed, adaptive modules
for perception and action. But during growth these preadapted
neuronal groups compete, so that experience shapes the
brain by selecting among innate microcircuits.... Finally,
chaos and complexity models help explain brain growth
in at least two ways. First, sensitivity to initial conditions
can multiply small differences exponentially,...[but]
chaotic unpredictability does not fan out indefinitely.
Patterns emerge, as chaos in the developing brain resolves
of its own accord. This is order, to be sure, but it is
not genetically determined order. Still, many patterns
are genetically
coded. Chaotic and emergent effects, like activity-dependent
ones, occur throughout development but are constantly
pushed, pulled, shaped, and molded by the genes.”
(Konner, p.424)
“The fact is that
no simple construct will ever explain how the disparate
tasks of brain building are shared between genes and enironment.
Talk of heredity and environment has transcended the ‘versus,’
passed beyond the ‘which’ and the only slightly
more useful ‘how much,’ to the mature question
of ‘how.’ Now we know that this is not one
question, but thousands. For each system at each moment
in development, we may have on our hands a different balance,
a different division of labor, a different integration
of genes and the world. People being what they are, the
torrent of argument between hereditarians and environmentalists,
bigots of different stripes, will foolishly continue.
For the unsuspecting listener, it will obscure subtle
issues and sabotage understanding. Meanwhile...things
have come far enough, though, to say that any analysis
of human nature that tends to ignore either the genes
or the environment can be be decisively discarded.”
(Konner, p.70)
By careful attention to the best empirical work - and
to its inevitable weaknesses and lacunae - Konner manages
the extremely difficult task of straddling the sciences
and the humanities with grace, albeit with little patience
for those whose ideologies obstruct their understandings.
In consequence, this is a synthesis with the sharp edges
left in, as in this incisive dissection of the complex
causation of behavior, adapted from Tinbergen:
1. What events in the
environment immediately triggered the behavior, releasing
stimuli that may be learned or unlearned?
2. What are the immediate
physiological causes, the neural circuits and neurotransmitters,
that produced the behavioral output?
3. How have slower-acting
physiological events, such as hormone levels or disease
processes, set the tone of neural circuits?
4. What routine outside
events, such as reinforcement, modeling, or stress, though
not the immediate precipitating factors, may have altered
the organism’s response tendencies?
5. Were remote environmental
causes at play, such as the special effects of experience,
nutrition, or insults during sensitive periods in early
life, including life before birth?
6. What events of embryonic
development and their postnatal equivalents have shaped
the relevant circuits and their hormonal context?
7. What genes directed
the wiring-up of the circuits and coded the precursors,
enzymes, and receptors for the needed hormones and neurotransmitters?
8. What adaptive function
does the behavior serve? Or, what process of natural selection
favored it in the natural environment. In effect, what
caused the gene code?
9. What is the animal’s
broad heritage? The wings of flies come from thorax; of
birds, from forelimbs; of bats, from fingers, and of human
beings, from airplane factories. Each species solves this
problem differently, as phylogenetic history constrains
the response to the same environmental challenge....
“It can be said
that all behavior consists of responses to the environment
at various levels of causality, beginning with natural
selection. [And] only in this framework can we give more
than a partial account of what causes aggression, or any
other behavior.”
(Konner, p.183)
Perhaps the main problem reviewing a work of this nature,
is in giving the correct impression of its scope. I have
- deliberately - chosen here to concentrate upon the programmatic
level of the work, as I am sure that a mere sampling of
empirical sections would not do justice to it. Yet this
runs the risk of failing to suggest the sheer variety
of points Konner makes, many of them in beautifully phrased
asides which will likely stay in the mind long after much
factual detail has faded...
“Although it has
been argued otherwise, there is undoubtedly life, including
intelligent life, elsewhere in the universe. By ‘undoubtedly’
I mean not with absolute certainty, of course - only what
I might mean by ‘The sun will undoubtedly rise tomorrow
morning.’ I mean with the strange and wise combination
of common sense, science, and metaphor that is the closest
we get to certainty from where we sit on this awkward,
lonely planet. We may never find the intelligent life
- it is probably too far away - but it is there.”
(Konner, p.43)
When Sarah B. Hrdy reviewed The
Tangled Wing recently, she explicitly contrasted
it with those superficially similar works which remain
“the moral equivalent of fast food”. One of
the key reasons for this is that Konner is explicit about
the difficulties involved in studying human behavioral
biology, and severely critical of work which does not
come up to his (very high) standard. Rather than gloss
over such faults, he is explicit in naming and detailing
them. This is yet another reason why he remains the best
guide in this area.
“Studies of heritability
often make assumptions that apply to animals but certainly
do not apply to humans, yet these procedures have been
relied upon as if they did. For example, in mouse studies
animals are randomly assigned to different environments
that have no relations to their genes, whereas in humans
environments are almost always correlated with genes,
making it much harder to separate the two. Not surprisingly
conventional estimates of IQ heritability, for instance,
ranged from about 45 to about 80 percent, which leaves
a lot of room for error. These estimates are also based
on the assumption that two given genetic endowments -
say, extroversion and introversion - can be compared in
a consistent way regardless of the environment - an assumption
now known to be false. In reality, simple linear predictions
may turn out to be quite wrong, because the rank order
of genotypes can change in different environments.”
(Konner, pp.81-2)
“What, then of
those famous genes, and the countless studies that prove
their power? Even the good studies need more thought.
One of the major sources of error in some behavior-genetic
research (and of genetic studies in general) is the strange
statistical specter called an interaction effect. [Unfortunately,]
much of behavioral genetics, especially the genetics of
intelligence, has discounted such interaction effects
or, in some cases, invented them.... [Furthermore,] since
the calculations of heritability in even the best studies
never include [genuinely] dramatic cultural variety, there
is a real, statistical sense in which they always and
inevitably overstate the power of genes.”
(Konner, pp.426-39)
But the best example of Konner’s care in balancing
all these different kinds of influences, at least to my
mind, is his simple statement “But all else is never
equal” (Konner, p.276)...a genuinely true observation
that we should all remind ourselves of - next time we
are tempted to engage in a “nothing but” argument.
In a similar spirit, he also offers us this sobering assessment
of the Human Genome Project, deeply contrary to the bombastic
puffery proffered by the mass media:
“To get an idea
of where we really are, consider this analogy. You have
just been handed a shiny new phone book for a small city.
Here, you are told, are the names, addresses, and phone
numbers of most of the 50,000 residents. Your task: explain
the city. The directory is 90 percent accurate,
and you see the gaps and errors, but that is not the problem.
The problem is that the list tells you nothing about the
city. You do see few annotations...[but] that’s
about it. That’sall you know. Now try to reconstruct
the city....It’s just a matter of figuring out which
ones are which, what they all
exactly do, and why they don’t always cooperate.
Don’t laugh, because it’s roughly where we
are in the genome.”
(Konner, p.453)
And, finally, despite his belief in the importance of
behavioral biology, Konner is blunt about the appalling
political history associated with it. But, as he also
points out, the same can be said about the “blank
slate” ideology, although this is far too often
forgotten. We should exert care, true, but this should
not restrain us from seeking out the truth of our nature
- for that may offer our best chance for crafting institutions
which can help make the best of it.
“Human behavioral
genetics is the most controversial of all pursuits in
behavioral biology, as it should be. It was only yesterday
that an explicitly genetic theory of human behavior resulted
in, or at least strongly supported, the ghettoization,
deportation, concentration, enslavement, and mass extermination
of millions of helpless victims guilty of absolutely nothing....
[But, unfortunately,] rejection of genetic theories has
been no guard against the terrors of authoritarian violence.
Deportation, imprisonment, virtual enslavement, and direct
or indirect slaughter of as many as 20,000,000 innocent
Soviet citizens was based on an ideology rejecting the
stable effects of genes.... The ‘Jew-Free Europe’
and ‘The New Soviet Man’ were approached through
partly similar means, despite stemming from irreconcilable
theories.... So there is no morally save haven in ideology,
culture, or history, unless it is an ideology of decency,
a culture of respect, and a slowly, painstakingly earned
history of fair play.... [And] only a serious study of
our nature, in the context of the rest of the natural
world, will allow us to protect ourselves at this precarious
evolutionary juncture. In the meantime, if you ask me
how to set your sail in the storm of claim and counterclaim,
of fact and lie and theory, of warning, prophesy, judgement
and exhortation, I do have a bit of advice that I earnestly
believe in. It can be summarized in the one-word injunction:
Doubt.”
(Konner, pp.476-9)
“Contrary to the
predictions of the Social Darvinists, current conditions
do not result in the survival of the fittest - or rather,
they do, but only if we mean fittest for war, dictatorship,
racism, genocide, famine, disease, inequality and poverty.
If we want, instead, those people who are fittest for
peace, democracy, justice, health, equality, productivity,
creativity and prosperity, then somehow we must begin
to create those conditions first.”
(Konner, p.455)
Melvin Konner’s The
Tangled Wing makes the best possible case for the
compatibility of behavioral biology with the humanistic
insights of literature. Konner’s beautiful prose,
his care in assessing evidence, and his refusal to discard
the insights of humane learning combine triumphantly in
a compelling synthesis which easily outclasses its
“competitors” from both ideological extremes
of the ill-considered “nature versus nurture”
debate. This is no small achievement, and all those who
are genuine in wishing to learn about humanity should
investigate it forthwith...
“We must choose,
and choose soon, either for or against the further evolution
of the human spirit. It is for us, in the generation that
turned the corner of the millennium, to apply whatever
knowledge we have, in all humility, but with all due speed,
and to try to learn more as quickly as possible. It is
for us, much more than for any previous generation, to
become serious about the human future and to make choices
that will be weighed not in a decade or a century but
in the balances of geological time. It is for us, with
all our stumbling, and in the midst of our terrible confusion,
to try to disengage the tangled wing.”
(Konner, p.488)
John Henry Calvinist
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