
shytone
books music
essays
home exploratories
new this month
book reviews
Georges Duby:
The Early Growth of the
European Economy:
warriors
and peasants from the seventh to the twelfth century
(Cornell University Press:
1974)
“At the end of
the sixth century, Europe was a profoundly uncivilized
place....Amid this widespread cultural depression, however,
there were certainly variations. On her southern boundaries,
Latin Christendom was brought face to face with areas
that were appreciably more advanced than herself.... On
the other hand, two kinds of cultural deficiency confronted
each other within Europe herself.... Between these two
faces, the one turned towards the north and east, the
other towards the Mediterranean, sprawled an area along
the shores of the English Channel, in the Paris basin,
in Burgundy, Alamannia and Bavaria, where contacts between
the youthful forces of barbarism and the remnants of Rome
were made more actively than elsewhere.... It is important
not to lose sight of this geographical diversity; it was
fundamental and in a large measure governed the early
stages of European economic growth.”
(Duby, pp.3-4)
Too often, we lazily assume that European “exceptionalism”
must be a simple thing. Whether it’s supposed to
be delivered by blood, or culture, understandings here
tend to be far too foreshortened by historical specialization...and,
by the failure of economic records as we descend further
into the past. Of all the works relevant to this
issue, however, George Duby’s The
Early Growth of the European Economy to my mind
best explains it, even though the question is never explicitly
raised throughout the book.
“During the period
with which we are concerned, the forest seems to have
held sway over the whole natural landscape.... Down to
the end of the twelfth century, the proximity of a vast
forest reserve was reflected in all aspects of civilization....[But,
even] in the seventh century, the European forest seems
to have been dotted with innumerable clearings. Some were
recent and small, like those providing the first monks
of St Bavon of Ghent with food. Others were more ample,
as where fields and scrubland had intermingled for centuries
on the loamy plateaux of Picardy...[Overall, though,]
in this human void, space was plentiful. What constituted
the real basis of wealth at that time was not ownership
over land but power over men, however wretched their condition,
and over their rudimentary equipment.”
(Duby, pp.5-13)
This picture of extreme fragmentation of power combined
with proximity to highly civilized regions, without being
overly vulnerable to conquest - the lucky result of peripheral
location and a strongly fragmented topography - was noted
by Jared Diamond as the reason for Europe’s modernism
at the end of his Guns,
Germs, and Steel. Drawing together all the relevant
information 25 years earlier, however, Duby analyzed the
perverse processes by which a hyper-competitive warrior
aristocracy, driven to economic means by the forces they
had no control over, nurtured the markets which would
first destroy their raison d’etre, and then their
power and society...thus setting the stage for the unanticipated
rise of the modern world.
But all that was a long way off. Metal of all sorts was
incredibly scarce, and almost never used for peaceful
pursuits, the climate had only just begun to improve after
a long, cold spell lasting centuries, livestock was too
rare for adequate fertilization of the fields, leading
to beggarly yields and long unproductive fallowing periods,
and most peasants needed to make substantial use of wild
foods if they were not to starve. Welcome to the Dark
Ages...
“Among the contrast
still distinguishing regions impregrated with Latin culture
from those where the barbarian elements predominated in
the eighth century, one of the sharpest was in attitudes
to war. The Germanic invasions had made reverence for
the warriors’s virtues penetrate the aristocratic
mentality even in the most Romanized districts. But long
after the peasants of Aquitaine, Auvergne or Provence
has been disarmed, those of Thuringia or Northumbria continued
to regard the seasonal pillaging expedition as a normal
means of obtaining supplies.... In the most barbarous
communities of the West, weaponry seems to have been the
earliest and most profitable of investments. It was certainly
with an eye to greater effectiveness in battle that technical
innovations in iron-working, horse-breeding and ship-building
were first promoted, innovations that later on were to
serve to increase the peaceable production of wealth....[As
well,] military enterprises brought about the destruction
of tribal structures and the strengthening of the aristocracy’s
economic position as the victors stepped in and perfected
the system of seigneurial exploitation. The establishment
of internal peace [then] promoted capital accumulation,
the formation of contacts between different regions led
to the opening up of vast areas of exchange, Thus war
hastened the march of progress. Two principal stages in
this slow process stand out, corresponding to the two
most important political and military adventures of the
period: the Carolingian and the Viking.”
(Duby, pp.75-6)
Here is the pattern in all its perversity. Dispersed power
made for constant war - which, particularly when in contact
with more civilized areas, drove technological change.
However, win or lose, the tribal units were doomed, as
their productivity could not compete with a fully agrarian
order run for the benefit of warrior aristocrats, who
colonized those areas which did not convert to this model.
But, similarly, the “natural” pattern for
this society (serfdom) could not itself compete with a
superficially “similar” one in which labour
services were transformed into money rents, and market
principles started to dominate social arrangements. This
pattern had been seen before in history, but typically
broke off as the aristocracy became fully domesticated
by some imperial power. But here the forces of consolidation
were broken by external attack, the military reoriented
externally by ideology, and merchants themselves became
martial, so that the emerging autocracies following feudalism’s
prime then struck bargains with the market for their crucial
military forces, uniting technological innovation and
force in a self-perpetuating cycle highly unusual at such
a civilized level. But we get ahead of ourselves, for
the pattern at the start of our period was a very different
one:
“Society as a
whole was shot through with an infinitely varied network
for circulating the wealth and services occasioned by
what I have called ‘necessary generosity’:
gifts of dependants to their protectors, of kinfolk to
brides, of friends to party-givers, of magnates to kings,
of kings to aristocrats, of all the rich to all the poor,
and lastly of all mankind to athe dead and to God. True,
we are here dealing with exchanges, and there are plenty
of them. But it is not a question of Trade .
”
(Duby, p.56)
“In actual fact,
the expansion of trade in medieval Europe...was only the
gradual and always incomplete dovetailing of an economy
of pillage, gift and largess into a framework of monetary
circulation. And that framework was already in existence;
it was the legacy of Rome.”
(Duby, p.57)
But it was badly run down, and there was so little money
in circulation north of the Alps that when rulers started
minting again, they minted - essentially - first for largess,
creating gold coins with their faces on, to broadcast
their splendour in princely gifts. As Duby stresses, this
was not a market
economy.
“By leading their
comrades and vassals on annual pillaging expeditions,
Charles Martel, Pepin and Charlemagne had amassed wealth
from all quarters. They had also given away a good deal
of it. This necessary generosity through distributions
of movable goods had added added appreciably to the resources
the aristocracy were able to dedicate to self-indulgence.
Such an increment in spending-power, in a culture growing
accustomed to the use of money, had the effect of stimulating
the real trade in expensive items. Second, immersed in
this affluence, magnates made little personal effort to
exploit their landed wealth.... When surveys lay bare
their structure after the year 800, the great estates
look like fossilized organisms whose unwieldiness tended
to stand in the way of demographic expansion. Thirdly,
in the course of the ninth century, two developments forced
these organisms to become less rigid and to adapt themselves.
These were the gradual influence of money circulation,
and the sudden end to [internal] wars of conquest. To
preserve their way of life, the diminishing returns from
booty and tribute led magnates magnates to stir up enthusiasm
on the part of their farm managers: manors had to be made
to yield more.”
(Duby, pp.110-11)
The initial means to this were to be serfdom, and technical
innovation in agriculture. But the role of force in the
equation was to be considerably complicated by external
attack - which commenced about the same time as (relative)
peace within Christendom was achieved through the intermediary
of the Church. The confluence of all of these factors,
with all their micro-regional variants in competition
with each other, is bewilderingly complex...yet essential
to the future that was to come:
“Feudalism was
characterized in the first instance by the decay of royal
authority, and...the inability of Carolingian kings to
contain attacks by outsiders hastened the dispersion of
their power in the ninth century. Defense of the land
- the original function of kingship - passed rapidly and
irreversibly into the hands of local princes.... Afterwards,
most of the great principalities themselves disintegrated
little by little...[until] towards the year 1000, commanders
of individual strongholds won their independence from
the princes.... [This] constituted an adjustment to the
concrete possibilities of exercising effective authority
in a rural and barbaric world where it was difficult to
communicate over any distance.... But it is important
to stress that this change was accomplished just when
the memory of seasonal wars of pillage, formerly conducted
by the whole body of free men against external tribal
enemies, was fading from the peasant mentality. It also
coincided with the adoption of a new type of warfare,
and with the creation of a new concept of peace.... It
would no longer be permissible to fight - any more than
to handle money or to indulge in sexual intercourse -
except within precise limits.... Europe’s fragmentation
into countless political units might have created conditions
for military confrontations to increase, for new strength
to be lent to tribal warfare, and for economic organization
based largely on incessant plundering to be restored in
the European heartland.... [Instead,] the crusading spirit,
emanating directly from the new peace ideology, guided
them towards external war-fronts, towards the prosperous
border-lands, where fighting acted as a powerful stimulant
to the circulation of wealth.”
(Duby, pp.162-4)
The results were complex and seemingly contradictory.
For example, serfdom sunk those peasants previously free
into a network of legal liabilities and labour obligations
that verged upon slavery, yet the reliance upon (profoundly
inefficient) forced labour was in conflict with the emerging
money economy - wherein the most desirable objects were
located - leading rapidly to the replacement of serfdom
proper with the payment of quitrents...and hence the peasantry
to market rather than autarky and feudal subjugation in
the narrow sense...although this was to be a highly variable
process that stalled in the east.
As to the Vikings, by re-mobilizing gold and silver locked
in ecclesiastical treasuries, they actually speeded the
growth of the money economy - and, hence, the peasants’
ability to mitigate the conditions of serfdom - all the
sooner. Moreover, as Duby notes, there was a direct comparison
which could be drawn between these heathens and the founders
of the European order - and one which became even more
obvious once Norsemen had become Normans:
“Most of the invaders
in fact were motivated by the same ambitions as the conquering
war-bands that had sprung from the Frankish nobility during
the seventh and eighth centuries: they were seeking adventures
by which to earn their reputation, treasure from which
to replenish their hospitality, slaves with whom to furnish
their homes, and lands upon which to quarter their weapons.”
(Duby, p.114)
Still, whilst I can sketch the overall process well enough
here, much of the richness of Duby’s account lies
in the details peculiar to individual regions and towns.
This is where the crucial import of European variety genuinely
comes to the fore, as we can see how adaptations
spread from a whole plethora of localities so as to gradually
forge a “world beating” system that no united
Europe could have delivered.
“The commercial
development of Pisa and Genoa was...violently bound up
with...the idea of a holy war, then slowly coming to maturity
on the ‘frontiers’ of the Iberian peninsula....
Venetians and Amalfians had based on peaceful trading
agreements their activities in entrepots on Moslem territory,
their warehouses protected like those of the Jews. But
sailors from the northern part of the Tyrrhenian Sea built
their ships primarily for privateering.... When the First
Crusade was launched, seafaring warriors from the two
towns had just sacked Mahdia; they were already in control
of the ports of the lower Rhone and the Narbonnaise; now
they were ready to pursue their depredations as far as
the prosperous shores of the eastern Mediterranean. It
would not be long before they were transmitting through
the medium of peaceable commercial practices the greed
for gain, the taste for rapine, the assumption that the
principal forms of wealth were moveable and could be reckoned
up in cash. These mental traits were quite foreign to
the rustic civilization of western Europe, but would henceforth
characterize the outlook of merchants. Such mental attitudes
had nevertheless been formed in an environment imbued
with the adventurous spirit of warfare exhibited by the
Vikings and their successors, whose aggressiveness their
raids had roused.”
(Duby, pp.147-8)
But perhaps the clearest examples of perverse long-term
outcomes can be found in the troubled intersections between
religion and money, albeit the culminating irony is definitely
that of chivalry: literally enthroned as it doomed its
champions to bankruptcy. This is the real story of the
Middle Ages...
“At a time when
no one else in the rest of Latin Christendom was yet denying
the Church the right to display her worldly power, and
accumulate precious metals in her sanctuaries to magnify
the glory of God, Italian townsmen were first in wishing
to despoil her. Becuase to them, money had become an instrument,
and wealth was no longer simply a reward for heroic deeds
but had lost its moral virtue, these townsmen could instead
see perfection in destitution.”
(Duby, p.150)
“In order to start
off on their travels, pilgrims had to raise cash, use
it and distribute it. People of any rank might take advantage
of free board and lodging at religious houses, but they
could not so benefit at every stopping-place. And whilst
on pilgrimage they did not as a rule secure their food
supplies by pillaging, so long as they remained on Christian
soil. They would thus leave behind them a trail of denarii,
to be picked up by producers and middlemen, which acted
as a stimulus from every cross-roads right into the countryside.
In addition, these journeys often took them to the turbulent
borderlands of Christendom, where there would be many
opportunities for profitable looting.”
(Duby, p.160)
“Chivalry...exemplified
as the sole outlook worthy of the perfect man characteristic
forms of behaviour with regard to wealth: not to produce
but to destroy; to live in a lordly fashion from the ownership
of land and authority over people, the only sources of
income not held ignoble; and to spend on entertainment
without thought for the cost. When in the second half
of the twelfth century the financial difficulties of the
upper ranks of the lay aristocracy worsened, when the
debts of great lords to townsmen accumulated, when the
art of governing with money inclined princes to chose
their best servant no longer from the nobility, but from
mercenary warriors and numerate merchants, this model
or cult of cavalierish indolence and extravagance became
even more entrenched.... It formed the sinews of class
consciousness.”
(Duby, p.257)
Georges Duby’s The
Early Growth of the European Economy is hardly
a typical economic history. For a start, it contains hardly
any numbers, due to the paucity of sources for this period.
Instead, it explores how a fragmented and backward region,
dominated by the patterns of force and display (characteristic
of Peter J. Wilson’s “domesticated”
societies) gradually became “marketized” through
a highly complex process of differentiation and competition,
driven by the very display characteristics that were in
the process of being marginalized.
By starting at the lowest point in European history
- following upon the demographic shocks of war, famine
and plague - Duby shows the deep roots of European “exceptionalism”
in fact lay precisely in its fragmentation of power and
position on the very edge of the Eurasian continent, adjacent
to much more civilized regions. To students of ancient
Greece, this pattern will prove startlingly familiar,
albeit radically different in the details. And it is for
the details that we should read this history. Following
in the great Annales
tradition of Marc Bloch (and Fernand Braudel), Duby has
synthesized data from geography, demography, climatology,
agricultural, military, political, and economic history
to trace the emergence of the economy that would one day
birth ours. It is a fascinating tale...
“In the seventh
century...a movement of growth had commenced. Progress
in agricultural production had sustained it and met the
requirements of a military aristocracy who owned the land,
terrorized those who laboured on it, and had as their
prime concern to make their munificence ever more ostentatious.
Before the first millennium output from farming had remained
very low; growth had been mainly that of a war economy,
with slavery and pillage forming its twin foundations.
In the feudal peace that had then been established, the
determining conquests had gradually become those of the
peasantry, goaded by siegneurial constraints to keep producing
more, increasingly numerous and therefore increasingly
free to manage their labour in their own way and to sell
its fruits.... Until now, agriculture had been the driving
force behind all development; henceforth it became an
auxiliary. During the late twelfth century we can discern
the first symptoms of landhunger, which before long was
to bring about a lasting deterioration in peasant circumstances....
After 1180, the profit motive steadily undermined the
spirit of largess. Nostalgia for this virtue still lingered,
yet it adorned none but mythical heroes, at once symbols
and guardians of values that medieval people had long
extolled as living and supreme.”
(Duby, pp.269-70)
John Henry Calvinist
|
|